issue in misplaced confidence in models, "even when one has no grounds to believe that the axioms are true (with qualifications) of anything real" (Hausman 1981a, p. 374) . One can avoid these unwanted concomitants without introducing new philosophical problems simply by sticking to the inexact laws view. For, "if one is willing to talk of possible worlds, the qualified [inexact laws] view entails the counterfactual view" (p. 373). Thus, the inexact laws interpretation happily conforms to Hausman's preferred criteria of being "an interesting and [an] accurate philosophical reconstruction of Mill's remarks" (p. 373, emphasis added).
There are certain clear gains to be had from this approach. It forces one to consider Mill in a new light; in particular, it offers a way of reading his substantive contributions to economics in isolation from his more general philosophical views. Without denying these advantages, it seems appropriate to point out some of the costs of accepting Hausman's reconstruction. His procedure exaggerates differences of emphasis between Mill's early essay and the Logic into differences of methodological commitment.
At the same time it underplays differences within the Logic between what Mill says of science in general and what he says about political economy (hereafter economics).
Accepting these distortions as an unavoidable cost has further implications: one is apt to miss asking certain interesting questions to do with the evolution of economics. Whether or not one agrees with Imre Lakatos's suggestion that reconstructions be presented along with the "real" history, written in footnotes, a strong case exists for having both available. My purpose here is to complement Hausman's essay by showing something of what may be lost if precedence is given to philosophical concerns over the historical record.
II
To tackle the distortions first, the contextual evidence seems to point away from a switch in the way Mill viewed economic laws between "On the Definition of Political Economy . . ." (1836) and the Logic (1843). This evidence can be summarized quite briefly, although it is convenient to leave it until the end. A second point requires more elaborate development. Put bluntly, it is this. Hausman's technique of philosophical reconstruction leads him to present a distorted version of Mill's doctrine of verification as it applies to economics.
The issues here can best be presented by reconstructing Hausman's own reconstruction of Mill's ideas. Hausman believes that the propositions used in modern microeconomics comprise general empirical postulates that are not quite true (hence are inexact) and assertions cast as conditional predictions that are also inexact because they involve some more or less vague ceteris paribus clause. Notice one other element in Mill's view. He speaks of verification in the essay as indispensable, just as he did subsequently in the Logic; but it is in the sense of "an indispensable supplement to" the method of abstract truth (4: p. 327). Verification, that is to say, belongs to the application not to the science of economics.
Taking at face value Mill's distinction, then, the counterfactual method has its own province and rationale.' Verification belongs to applied economics. Hausman is correct in characterizing much of modem economics as concerned with inexact laws, and is right to emphasize the crucial role of verification in fleshing out vague ceteris paribus clauses. Moreover, the inexact-laws approach does seem to capture the main thrust of Mill's Logic, both in respect of the conditions justifying lawlikeness and in the important role Mill assigns verification in his discussion of the deductive method in general. Hausman has to square his reconstruction with Mill's essay, however, so he suggests that Mill's early stress on modal truth was subsequently abandoned. I suggest that this interpretation is textually one-sided and historically false, the misformed product of Hausman's 1I have not discussed the rationale, but it is familiar, having to do with the vanity of hoping "that truth [general maxims] can be arrived at, either in Political Economy or in any other department of the social science, while we look at facts in the concrete, clothed in all the complexity with which nature has surrounded them, and endeavour to elicit a general law by a process of induction from a comparison of details" (Mill 1963 
III
In what sense is it fair to say that Hausman's interpretation is textually one-sided? I confine myself here very largely to the Logic. Hausman appeals primarily to Book 3, chapter 11 of the Logic, in which the three stages of the general deductive method, including verification, are outlined and given equal weight. Book 6, chapter 9, section 1 is also brought in, since there Mill stresses the complementarity of the a priori and the a posteriori for grounding one's confidence "in any concrete deductive science." Economics being classed as a concrete deductive science, this would seem to be conclusive evidence for verification and against the suppositional approach as valid in its own right.
The problem of textual interpretation, however, is more complicated than that. Consider the following:
(1) The very chapter preceding the exposition of the stages of the deductive method (3.10.6 through 8) is a tirade against "attempts . . . to prove economic doctrines by . . . a recital of instances" (Mill, 7: p. 453, note 3.10.8). So Mill's stress on verification can hardly be read as somehow in conflict with his general and longstanding antagonism to specific experience.
(2) The sections of chapter 9 in Book 6 following after the first section-the one cited by Hausman-stress the view that "all the general propositions of the deductive science, are therefore, in the strictest sense of the word, hypothetical" (7: p. 900, 6.9.2; original draft wording). Not only that, but verification's role is restricted quite severely. (a) Where empirical laws can be found-not the case in economics-still "the experimental process is not here to be regarded as a distinct road to the truth ." (Mill 8 : p. 908, 6.11.5). This is language reminiscent of the essay on method, where Mill says that "the method a posteriori, or that of specific experience, is althogether inefficacious . . . as a means of arriving at any considerable body of valuable truth" (4: p. 327). (b) In cases where we cannot derive empirical laws because social experimentation or unlimited observation is not open to us-the case of economics-"the only instance really fitted to verify the predictions of theory is the very individual instance for which the predictions were made; and the verification comes too late to be of any avail for practical guidance" (8: p. 909, 6.9.6; original draft wording). Notice that Mill makes an apparent allowance. If the case turns out to match the prediction it does indirectly verify "the general sufficiency of the theory" (p. 909). But this "general sufficiency" relates not to whether the statements of the theory qualify as lawlike, but only to whether it "affords safe ground for predicting (and consequently for practically dealing with) what has not yet happened" (pp. 909-10).
(3) This bears on a third element. The ground of confidence in theory to which Mill here and elsewhere refers obviously has to do with whether general tendencies can safely be applied. Hausman, recall, wants to use it as support for the notion that verification is essential if propositions are to be considered lawlike. This use is legitimate if Mill is talking about using verification to flesh out theory by enlarging our understanding of the vague ceteris paribus clause attached to inexact laws. Whatever Mill's intention in Book 3, by the time he comes to discuss economics and "political ethology," in Book 6, chapter 9, most decidedly he is not talking about verification to that particular end. He is talking about checking predictions in order to gauge how far they are off; that is, to identify how close truth in the abstract is to truth in the concrete. The check may show that theory needs to be extended or improved (Mill 8: p. 910, 6.9.6); but there is no question of its being less lawlike for having been shown to be incomplete in ways or in a degree that we were not fully aware of at the start. As Mill says of the neglect of "ethological" elements in separate social sciences such as economics: "The omission is no defect in them as abstract or hypothetical sciences, but it vitiates them in their practical application . . ." (8: pp. 905-6, 6.9.4).
(4) Finally, if we ask why Hausman conflates verification which fleshes out inexact laws with checks which merely show the degree of incompleteness of truth in the abstract, a plausible suggestion is that he has simply been misled by his desire to interpret Mill's discussion of economics as a discussion about inexact laws. This causes him to underplay, even though he is aware of, the fact that Mill's conception of economics in the Logic is extremely narrow, just as it was in the earlier essay. Economics is not co-extensive with social science; and certainly it forms but a small part of the investigations that Mill says are characterized by the deductive method in general. It is one branch of the study of social phenomena and along with what he calls "political ethology," or the laws of collective (national) character (8: pp. 904-5, 6.9.4), it is the only one to which the method of hypothetical truth applies. In both these branches we are concerned with just one class of social facts which, in turn, are dependent on distinct causes. Hence it is possible and convenient to carve out a preliminary science based on these causes alone (p. 905). It is this which gives to each its hypothetical character. History, sociology, psychology, politics-all are different in this respect from economics and ethology. On closer examination, it emerges that of these two it is only economics that is well developed. Of ethology Mill writes: "Of all the subordinate branches of the social science, this is the most completely in its infancy" (p. 905). Given the very special position occupied by eco-nomics, it should not be difficult to accept that Mill's views on lawlikeness and on the role of verification in general might have to be understood as distinct from what he had to say about that one discipline. Hausman may be right in this interpretation of Mill's general views but he is wrong in assuming that these views apply equally to Mill's economics.
IV
This raises a problem that we shall notice briefly. Grant that Mill accorded economics a special and limited place even in the field of social inquiry. Grant, too, that Hausman is substantially correct in characterizing the propositions of modern microeconomics as qualified, inexact laws. Are we not forced to conclude that Mill's economics and modern economics are different entities? I accept that Mill may have viewed economics rather differently than modern economists. This is more a problem for Hausman than for me, since it is he who wants to forge a connection.
For me the problem is to explain (a) what, then, happened to Mill's peculiar (modal) economics; and (b) how it is that Mill's general influence as a methodologist seems to have outlived his particular insistence on the modal interpretation of economic laws.
I offer here only some fairly conjectural remarks on these questions. In terms of substance, Mill's economics simply rapidly reached its natural limits; and that happened for the reason that you can't say much in detail if your explanations have to run in terms of the direct influence of the wealth motive.2 More circumspectly put, one can supply detailed answers involving long chains of reasoning, provided mathematical techniques are used to set up elaborate models involving precisely specified initial conditions. These interpose between the remote cause and the particular results. Mill was in command of virtually no mathematical techniques, hence it is not surprising to find him suggesting that value theory, for example, direct explanation in terms of the wealth motive has been by moving into other disciplines, exemplified in the economic analysis of politics, marriage, and the family. But this so-called economic imperialism has been strictly a lateral movement.
None of this is directly relevant to the fate of Mill's economics as modal truth. That lived on for many years in the form of taxonomic analysis of possible cases, conditioned somewhat by a demand for realism.3 However, it too had largely succumbed by the 1940s, swamped by demands for still greater relevance (Clapham's empty boxes; the need to explain the Great Depression), and the rising tide of operationalism and econometrics. It has survived into modern economics only in very attenuated form,4 as the practice of dealing in assumptions that are plausible: close enough to the actual world being studied to guarantee the applicability of a model version of it. This, however, is part of the economics profession's general preference for dealing in true assumptions and true arguments and is really quite distinct from counterfactual (modal) analysis of the sort Mill pursued. Counterfactuals can be characterized as involving unalterably false antecedents, even if these are specified as Mill defined economic man, to be fairly close to reality.
As to the second question, I conjecture that Mill's influence as methodologist has been more persistent but, paradoxically, not because of his conviction that economics is a science of truth in the abstract. Rather, he has continued to influence economic methodologists and economists because he was an early user of what we now know as the deductive-nomological model of explanation,5 replete with the requirements that the general ("covering") laws be testable and true (Mill, tures. Many among the early econometricians tended to search for these "true" relationships in the data and were wont to explain regression residuals as being due to omitted variables.6 This is exactly how an applied Millian economist would go about things. It is the analogue of Hausman's inexact-laws approach. Note, however, that it has little but the use of models in common with the modal-truth approach. As indirect evidence of a lack of interest in modal truth, it is striking that Mill's essay on method is reprinted infrequently in collections of classics of economic methodology whereas, say, extracts from J. N. Keynes or Lionel Robbins, both of whom stressed the a priori deductive, but not the strictly suppositional character of economics, are not uncommon.7 Mill, it seems, has survived, but in ways that he himself might well find not wholly appropriate. This digression illustrates the desirability of combining historical and philosophical inquiry. Philosophical reconstructions, of course, have their place; but it is well to guard against distortion by making explicit the implied historical interpretation behind the reconstruction. There was sufficient, though not much, time for a significant change of view to be incorporated in the Logic. But we lack a cause which might have provoked such a major change. Moreover, it is implausible that Mill would have allowed an essay to which he had devoted so much care and for which he entertained such high expectations to be republished just a year after one of its central emphases had been so seriously undermined-if that is what we are to believe-in the Logic.
To this may be added that there can be no doubt that Mill believed the underlying laws shaping economic investigations (the desire for wealth, the procreative urge, diminishing returns) were both known and true. That being so, there would have been little need felt on his part to retreat from hypothetical analysis into "an unmysterious reliability" (achieved by verifying inexact laws) as "a good tonic" for taking abstract truth too seriously.9 Not only that but, as I have stressed, Mill's bete noire in the essay on method was not the over-confident modal reasoner but his opposite, the "mere empiric," or the man who would make generalizations on the basis of specific experience. 1 Hausman's purpose, recall, was to show how the inexact-laws interpretation can shed light on "current microeconomics and general equilibrium models and the strategy of neoclassical theorizing" (Hausman 1981a, pp. 381-82). It was not to provide a detailed reading of the texts nor, presumably, to stress the historical context of Mill's writing. My dissenting remarks stem from a conviction that this is a dangerous separation of tasks, involving certain costs which it is well to identify.
Hausman reads Mill on economics in the light of a set of conditions justifying lawlikeness and an interpretation of modern economics that matches these conditions. This is an exercise in (largely) philosophical reconstruction. It is driven by the view that Mill believed in similar con9Hausman does not suggest openly that Mill's seeing the need for such a tonic might help account for his supposed revision; but he stops only just short of saying that this would have been an appropriate adjustment on Mill's part. 10This is plain from the essay on method itself but is also clear from the sequence of still earlier essays written in the preceding decade or so. See Mill 1963, 4: especially pp. 19, 78-79, 324-25. ditions justifying lawlikeness, and the inference that he must therefore have held an interpretation of economics akin to that which Hausman believes is expressed in modem economics. This inference leads him to gloss over the sharp methodological distinction between economics and other parts of social science that Mill espouses in the Logic; and it induces him to suggest that Mill must have abandoned the views on economic science contained in his early essay, "On the Definition of Political Economy. . . ." My reading is that Hausman's inference is gratuitous and has unfortunate consequences. Glossing over the peculiarities ascribed to economics in the Logic requires a one-sided reading of the texts; while the associated suggestion that Mill switched views between 1836 and 1843 seems to be without historical warrant.
In the process of generating these distortions, certain intriguing historical issues are sloughed off. On my reading, Mill held and continued to hold a modal-truth view of economics, but it was gradually abandoned by the emerging economics profession as a whole. Why? Again, Mill seems to have retained a considerable reputation even among economic methodologists, but for reasons not linked to his espousal of modal truth. This process, too, is worth investigating. Hausman has done us a very useful service in restating Mill's position on verification and inexact laws. His contribution would have been that much richer, and considerably less midleading, had he been more sensitive the the historical implications of his reconstruction.
